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CHINA’S GLOBAL POWER AND DEVELOPMENT:




In the immediate post-Cold War scenario, there were many enthusi-
asts of neoliberal globalization and its effects. (Kumar 1997, Ianni 1996). In 
this aspect, Kenichi Ohmae (1996) was one of many authors who diagnosed 
the weakening of nation-states while others clung too heavily to the post-in-
dustrial societies theses, from Bell (1970) to Demasi (2000). While it is imper-
ative to recognize the profound systemic changes that have occurred since the 
late twentieth century, it is still impossible to dissociate national development 
and power. Moreover, it should be acknowledged the interdependence of the 
internal and international dimensions, given that state capacity and econom-
ic dynamism are preconditions for countries to act worldwide - although it 
seems insufficiently addressed in the context of International Relations.
Zakaria (1999) analyzes how rich nations become world powers fo-
cusing his study on the path of the United States rise, which began in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century. His approach converges with realist 
theory, demonstrating how the increase in economic power has enabled the 
country to leverage its influence on international relations, in parallel with the 
strengthening of its state apparatus (military and diplomatic) and effectively 
its interference for opening markets and access to international sources of 
resources. In the same perspective, Kennedy (1989) defends the thesis that 
the increase of productive capacity provides military capability both to support 
the acquisition and to guarantee the protection of wealth, but may generate 
hypertrophy of military power and a consequent weakening of national power 
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in the long run.
Realist approaches, however, do not capture the complex economic 
and institutional formations of each country, the nature and motivations of 
its expansionist projects, nor the synergy between state-territorial power and 
the power of capital. In this sense, a critical approach - though historically 
very restricted to the critique of the capitalist system - can help illuminate the 
different natures of imperial development and expansion processes as well 
as state-capital interaction in shaping the modern international system. In 
China’s case, it is necessary to understand its unstoppable rise, its impact on 
systemic reordering changing its power settings, as well as the uniqueness of 
its cosmology and its political-economic system.
Thus, this article aims elucidate the process by which the success of 
China’s development project drives the assertiveness of its engagement on 
major issues on the international agenda. To this end, the goal is to discuss 
the role of Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) in the rise of the Asian country. 
This is a government policy launched in 2015 aimed at promoting 10 strate-
gic sectors of smart manufacturing, internalizing complex supply chains and 
driving innovation. Increasing Chinese production complexity has widened 
the country’s participation not only in global production and trade, but in 
FDI innovation, issuance and reception activities. Naturally, its development 
recreates the parameters of China’s engagement and assertiveness globally, 
putting the level of tension and competitiveness inherent in its relations with 
the hegemon (United States of America) to another level.
Brief Notes on Global Power and Development
A critical approach about development and insertion in the interna-
tional system must overcome the existing cleavages in both modernization 
theories, grounded in the analysis of the inexorable process of overcoming 
traditional societies and boosting the enrichment of nations, as well as the 
theories of dependence, at least in those versions that crystallize the center-pe-
riphery relations. In those relations, both commodity exports and industriali-
zation recreate, in different ways, dependency through lack of access to state-
of-the-art technology and/or through the expansion of transfer profits and 
debt, among others mechanisms of stagnation (Mamigonian 2000).
Lenin himself (1979) offered an alternative analysis that goes beyond 
these cleavages. From the conformation of financial capitalism (monopolies), 
the expansion of the system is driven by the exportation of surplus capital 
in advanced countries. Capital globalizes to peripheral countries in search 
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for more lucrative investments. Indeed, in the center, the parasitic rentism 
causes some stagnation; yet in the periphery it generates conflicting plun-
dering tendencies to loot the weak links of imperialism and to unevenly pro-
mote new dynamic regions from their competitive advantages (Lenin, 1979, 
p. 621-23; 646-7). Thus, the global development of capitalism accentuates the 
contradictions of the world economy by creating, through colonial policies, 
large monopolies, which recreate their conditions of existence from the very 
reproduction of these colonial policies.
In the same line of thought, Arrighi also seeks in history the root of 
the great systemic changes, analyzing the process of displacement of the dy-
namic areas of capitalism. Stages of material expansion give way to phases of 
financial expansion, shaping systemic cycles of accumulation and transitions 
of power. From Genoa (from the 15th to the 17th) to the Netherlands (end of 
the 16th to the 18th), then England (from the 18th to the beginning of the 
20th) and the United States (late 19th to the present), more and more com-
prehensive and complex governmental and business structures were formed 
- imposing limits on system expansion (Arrighi 1996)2.
With emphasis on production or systemic circulation, the fact is that 
development results from the combination of global processes with national 
policies suited to conjunctural opportunities. Regarding the domestic sphere, 
the history of developed countries teaches, on the one hand, that there is no 
single model or path, but, on the other, that there are parameters and pre-
requisites which without no country has historically developed. The South 
Korean Chang (2004) points out that absolutely all countries now considered 
developed have made extensive use of industrial, trade and technology (ICT) 
policy. That is, they all mobilized the state apparatus to boost development, 
rather than uncritically adopting liberal policies and models driven by ma-
jor powers and international organizations whose historical goal has been to 
‘kick away the ladder’ (Chang 2004) for the rise of new power poles.
According to Reinert, state policies are crucial in breaking the limita-
tions of ‘perfect competition’ in primary goods and their consequent ‘dimin-
ishing returns’, which imprison a number of countries to a static productive 
specialization. It is public emulation that promotes ‘imperfect competition’ 
and ‘rising incomes’ through technological change, dynamism in production 
chains and mechanisms of value addition to production, wage increases, mar-
ket densification, profit expansion and increase of the tax base. That is, the 
economies of scale, the technological changes and synergistic effects of ag-
2 This historical sequence proposed by him underestimates the importance of other 
civilizations, taking on too Eurocentric features, and greatly broadening his understanding of 
what defines the capitalist system. But this debate escapes the aims of the text.
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glomeration are part of these development processes. Thus, either the coun-
try seeks to insert itself in the capital-intensive links of international value 
chains or accept colonialism due to the comparative advantages of a given 
international division of labor (Reinert 2016).
The organization of the Atlas of Economic Complexity gives empirical 
substance to these notions that relate development with productive sophisti-
cation (Hausmann et al. 2011). In other words, economic complexity drives 
an intricate network of interactions and knowledge mobilized for production, 
whose increased productivity is linked to the addition of value, knowledge, 
innovation and, in effect, development. Productive complexity can be meas-
ured by the ability to produce non-ubiquitous and diversified goods3, as well 
as other variables such as increased HDI and reduced social inequalities for 
example (Hausmann et al. 2011, Gala 2017).
Gullo (2014) also points out that the ‘state impulse’ is not only faced 
with domestic challenges as it is a phenomenon that can challenge the world 
power structure, which he calls ‘founding insubordination’. Any national pro-
ject faces the limits imposed by the hegemonic structures of power, formed 
by complex mechanisms of domination, created by some countries and inter-
national organizations, as well as public and private actors that impose their 
interests as well (Guimarães 2000, p. 28). In fact, escape these mechanisms 
involves the articulation between anti-colonial struggles and the national is-
sue as the basis of emancipationist movements on the periphery of the sys-
tem - a question underestimated by ‘Western Marxism’, with its exalted and 
abstract internationalism and anti-capitalism notions (Losurdo 2018, p. 44).
The overcoming of the productive-technological gap is decisive both 
for national development and for the country’s position in the international 
division of labor, especially after the technical transformations resulting from 
the 3rd Industrial Revolution. Mazzucato (2014) demonstrates that even in 
the United States - a country presented as the bastion of liberalism and self-
made entrepreneurship - the state is at the center of technological innova-
tions, through the combination of public spending and governmental foster-
ing of university-business interaction. Defense spending (military-industrial 
complex), operated through government agencies, has played a central role 
in generating innovation for the economy. Recent technological advances in 
the computing, jets, nuclear power, lasers, biotechnology and drug sectors, 
as well as the shape of Silicon Valley itself, cannot be understood without the 
consideration of these heavy government investments. Even the notorious 
3 The case of Mexico is sui generis, given that the economy specialized in terms of Maquila 
characteristics and, in effect, inhibited the internalization of production chains and their chain 
effects (Gala 2017, p.80-1).
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case of the Iphone was only possible due to government research that previ-
ously enabled the creation of the internet, microprocessors, lithium battery, 
GPS, touch screens and communication technologies (HTTP and HTML) 
among other tools - an event not much different from the algorithm case that 
led to the creation of Google’s search mechanism. (Mazzucato 2014, p. 111; 
136).
In short, although unrecognized in liberal rhetoric, the dynamics of 
the international system have been the result of dialectical state-power and 
market-capital relations. Arrighi (1996) points out that since the Indian Com-
panies, capital and power act synergistically - and Washington today has been 
particularly emphatic in promoting and defending its strategic sectors4. In-
stead of the supposed antagonism between state-centered and transnation-
alist views, which is prevalent in international relations, it is appropriate to 
bet on critical approaches capable of understanding the intertwining between 
state territoriality and global processes of capitalist accumulation5. In other 
words, it is not possible to understand national development by dissociating it 
from the complex process of displacement of global decision-making centers, 
which, in turn, interact with national integration strategies, determining their 
respective autonomy and place in configurations (hierarchical) of power in 
the world.
China’s development and power
To understand the Made in China 2025, it is necessary to recover the 
trajectory of China, emblematic because of the tense and contradictory rela-
tionship between development and international insertion. The sophisticated 
Middle Kingdom enters what they call the ‘century of humiliation’ between 
the Opium War (1839) and the Chinese Revolution (1949), combining inter-
nal disorganization with international subordination to different imperialist 
powers. The revolution, therefore, intertwined the anticolonial character with 
that of national reconstruction, while at the same time facing upsets such as 
the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and international isolation 
after the Sino-Soviet rupture. Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Openness policy 
aimed at overcoming these contradictions by adjusting strategies for both na-
tional development and international insertion, taking into account Chinese 
4 Some notorious cases of banning the sale of US private companies for strategic reasons are 
Unocal (oil) that would be sold to China’s CNOOC in 2005; Lattice Semiconductor Corporation 
by the Chinese Canyon Bridge Fund in 2017; or Qualcomm (semiconductors) by Singapore-
based Broadcom (but with the ancestry of Chinese investors) in 2018.
5 In-depth discussion in another article, see Pautasso & Fernandes (2017).
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internal and external dimensions.
This policy triggered by Deng Xiaoping fits into a framework of the 
restructuring of both of capitalism and of US global power. On the one hand, 
the 3rd Industrial Revolution began, with new mechanisms of production or-
ganization (Toyotism) and an emerging international division of labor. On the 
other hand, the hegemon (United States) sought to restore control over the 
international monetary-financial system through the flexible dollar standard, 
combined with the 1980s military escalation (Reagan) against the USSR, the 
trade offensive against Japan and Germany (Plaza Accord - 1985) and its rap-
prochement with Communist China - in a scenario of US withdrawal from 
Vietnam and the intensification of both China and the US rivalry with the 
USSR. The Chinese case is symptomatic of the capacity to formulate nation-
al policies appropriate to systemic changes, demonstrating the possibility of 
overcoming domestic and international vulnerabilities.
That is, the construction of the Sino-American axis articulated US fi-
nancial globalization with the embryonic Chinese economic miracle, driving 
significant changes in the international division of labor and, consequently, 
in the world’s power configurations. It is a productive integration between 
the United States and China based on US FDI and the shaping of globalized 
industrial production chains, including companies from Asian countries or 
regions. In other words, this new Sino-American axis of accumulation, al-
though increasingly filled with geopolitical contradictions, has synergistic 
trade (broadening the trade chain), productive (articulation between US and 
Chinese companies in the global production chain), and financial (foreign 
reserves of China and US Treasuries) (Pinto 2011).
To some extent, the process described above converges with Arrighi’s 
(2008) analysis. For him, the financial expansion of the US cycle has driven 
the shift of the global economic epicenter from the North Atlantic to East Asia, 
resulting in the Asian revival under the leadership of the reemerging Chinese 
civilization and the rebuilding of the sinocentric system (Arrighi 2008). In 
this direction, China’s leadership has been promoting regional integration 
processes, both through organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganisation (SCO) and initiatives such as the New Silk Road, while proposing 
the country’s repositioning in the global arena as well as the redefinition of 
key elements of the international order6.
China’s trajectory of national development and international insertion 
stress the hegemonic power structures centered on the United States and its 
allies. As Belluzzo (2013) points out, in the West financial deregulation drives 
6 In-depth discussion in another article, see Pautasso & Ungaretti (2017).
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capital into the speculative spiral of account creation (fictitious) to the detri-
ment of production. Thus, large corporations are increasingly immersed in 
practices aimed at increasing financial assets, tied to the immediate logic of 
their shareholders - a sign not of the detachment of the fictitious appreciation 
of the stock of wealth, but in more advanced, socialized and contradictory 
ways of value creation in capitalism (Belluzzo 2013, p. 111-123).
Therefore, it remains to be seen how China will offer alternatives for 
shaping new global power configurations. China’s systemic impact has been 
significant in many dimensions, illustrated both by the profile of its exports 
and the performance of its companies on a global scale. Exports rose from 
US$ 16.8 billion in 1980 to US$ 82 billion in 1990, US$ 370 billion in 2000, 
US$ 1.680 trillion in 2010 and US$ 1.980 in 2016. Between 2007 and 2017 
China’s accumulated trade surpluses totaled nearly 3.5 trillion dollars7. In the 
1980s Chinese exports were practically restricted to oil and its derivatives, 
food and other primary products; during the 1990s they were made up of 
footwear, clothing, toys and other low value-added manufactured goods; now-
adays, predominate electro-electronic equipment, motors, vehicles, building 
materials, among other sophisticated goods8.
In a detailed study, it became clear that in 1962 China had only export 
competitiveness of 105 products; by 1980, when the transition began, China 
was already achieving such performance for a total of 234 items; in 2006, the 
export basket was already highly sophisticated and one of the most diversi-
fied in the world with around 270 goods (Felipe, Kumar, Usui, Abdon 2013). 
According to the aforementioned Atlas9, China had an economic complexity 
index of 0.143 in 1995 and 1.16 in 2016, rising from 50th to 18th in the world 
ranking - in the same period the United States went from 1.86 to 1.55, or from 
7th to 10th position. In 1992, just over 6% of Chinese exports were high-tech 
goods, reaching over 25% in 2016 - while the United States fell from 32.5% 
to 19.9%  in the same period the share of goods with high added value in its 
export agenda10. China’s performance is even reflected in asymmetries in its 
relationship with the United States, whose bilateral trade reached US$ 505.4 
billion in 2017 with surpluses of US$ 375.5 billion in favor of the chinese. 
Beyond the values, chinese exports of high-tech products reached, in 2016, 
7 View year data available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/263632/trade-balance-of-
china/
8 View data by volume, destinations and export component from China available at: https://
atlas.media.mit.edu/pt/profile/country/chn/
9 View the excellent dataset available at: http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/ 




the figure of 496 billion dollars, compared to 153 billion dollars of the US 
economy11.
The performance of Chinese companies globally reflects the expansion 
of the power of the eastern country in the international sphere. This fact can 
be well illustrated by the rapid expansion of the number of its multination-
als among the world’s major corporations. Notwithstanding the difficulties of 
measurement, variable data such as stock control and company profile, this is 
a significant rise from 18 companies in 2005 to 120 companies in 2018, listed 
among the 500 largest, according to Fortune - while in this the same period 
the United States went from 176 to 12612. During the Opening-Up Reform 
Policy of the late 1970s, the Chinese emphasis was on developing national 
productive capacity, attracting foreign investment directed for internalizing 
capital and technologies; from the 1990s onwards, China was already testing 
the projection of its foreign investments, prioritizing peripheral countries; 
since 2005, however, China has been expanding its investments abroad in 
a clear qualitative transformation of its business expansion (ZHU 2018). In 
line with this dynamic, the Going Global strategy was developed in 1999, pre-
cisely in the context of the country’s entry into the WTO (2001), oriented for 
increasing security in natural, alimentary and energetic resources, through 
the control of the value chains of these sectors in other countries. China is 
currently developing Going Global 2.0 with the central objective of driving de-
mand into the national economy by leveraging it through the New Silk Road13.
The intertwining and mutual strengthening of China’s national devel-
opment and foreign insertion is also expressed in the diplomatic sphere. Chi-
nese diplomacy has become more assertive, surpassing the low profile foreign 
policy advocated by Deng Xiaoping. This change stems from Beijing’s new 
objective conditions of power, which are essential for the country to assume 
commitments and responsibilities commensurate with its new status (Zhao 
2013, Tianquan 2012). Chinese assertiveness can be observed in promoting 
a new global financial architecture14, building regional integration processes 
(SCO, ASEAN + 1, New Silk Road) and/or more emphatically defending re-
gional security issues.
11 View official data from the United States Census Bureau, available at: https://www.census.
gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2016. 
12 See report China Daily, available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/20/
WS5b518b77a310796df4df7b77.html.  
13 See official document from the Government of China, available at: https://policycn.com/
wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-Chinas-going-global-strategy.pdf.
14 See debate in Pautasso (2015).
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Development and power in Made in China 2025 policy
Given the above, it is possible to understand the Made in China 2025 
as a sign of the deepening synergy between national development and en-
hancement of China’s global insertion. This is an exemplary case of state ca-
pacity to promote what Chang (2004) calls STI policy in favor of the nascent 
industry. In other words, the Chinese government has been promoting inter-
action between the state and the private sector, financing the merger of sec-
tors, shaping oligopolies (national champions) with a view to deepening the 
productivity and socialization of investment. State planning includes cheap 
financing through national public banks, production of low-priced basic in-
puts, and stimulating demand through government procurement. Diverging 
from the prevailing rentism in the neoliberal agenda, the State directs invest-
ments to chosen sectors capable of generating innovations and thickening 
supply chains while capital markets are regulated, avoiding the bubbles and 
collapses inherent in speculation cycles (Belluzzo, Sabbatini 2017).
In fact, state science, technology and innovation (ST&I) policies have 
historically been crucial to the development processes of nations, although 
later combined with liberal rhetoric (kicking the ladder) to undertake actions 
aimed at monopolizing their domains (patents) and even the inhibition of 
these same public policies, which gave rise to them in third countries. It is, 
therefore, a strategy of the world powers to reaffirm their advantages and, in 
full, the global asymmetries expressed in the international division of produc-
tion processes - or in the place that each country occupies in the value and 
wealth chains. Indeed, development combines a national project with capabil-
ities to break hegemonic international structures aimed at crystallizing global 
configurations of wealth and power.
In China’s case, the policies of reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and national reconstruction of the Mao Era are intertwined with the 
modernizing reforms triggered by the Deng Era. According to Gala (2017, 
91-2), there were several governmental public policies aimed at promoting 
China’s economic complexity, encompassing gradual trade opening, with a 
complex tariff system, non-tariff barriers and licenses; the attraction of con-
ditional investments on technological transfers, joint ventures, chains to na-
tional industries; strong incentives for reverse engineering and weak enforce-
ment of intellectual protection laws; the creation of national clusters through 
local content requirements; besides an economic policy capable of combining 
devalued exchange rate, low interest rates, capital control, among other mech-
anisms.
Its macroeconomic policy has as its vector public financing, driven 
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by a bank structure reorganized with the Reform and Opening Policy15. At 
the turn of the 1970-80, financial reforms were conducted aiming to create 
specialized operations for the various sectors of the economy, starting with 
the separation of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Firstly, China Construc-
tion Bank (CCB) for construction, Bank of China (BOC) for foreign currency 
transactions and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) for rural credit emerged 
- and also the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) to undertake 
the industrial and commercial control tasks of PBC’s banking activities in 
1984. In the 1990s, the three political banks that would focus Chinese de-
velopment finance emerged: the China Development Bank (CDB), the China 
Exim Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC). In ad-
dition, multilateral financial institutions, whose ancestry in China are central, 
were formed, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the 
New BRICS Development Bank, the China-Africa Development Fund, the 
New Silk Road, among others.
The banking system is also behind the accelerated internationaliza-
tion of Chinese companies, especially the state-owned enterprises (SOE). 
(Nicolas 2017). These companies have been working in synergy with chinese 
foreign policy to achieve goals ranging from food security, natural and energy 
resources, to demand creation strategies for the domestic market. Cai (2017, 
p. 17) highlights three sectors that have emerged in the chinese high-tech 
industry, notably high-speed rail, power generation equipment, and telecom-
munications equipment. In fact, all these sectors are linked to Beijing’s initia-
tives to promote infrastructure (communication, transport and energy).
Innovation is structuring to increase the productive complexity of the 
country and guides all ICT public policies. According to the World Bank’s16 
China 2030 document, Chinese innovation has been based on remarkable 
support for the specialization of productive activities; the integration of com-
panies with the national innovation system; the building of national research 
networks; the improvement of the quality of higher education; the qualifica-
tion of labor aiming at increasing labor productivity; increased spending on 
R&D and S&T; the promotion of new companies (start-ups); government pro-
curement aimed at stimulating innovation, etc. Notwithstanding the unique-
ness of the trajectory of each country, what is observed is that there is no 
15 In a recent report, the United Nations recognized the role of long-term development banks, 
according to a report available at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsecidc2016d1_
en.pdf.
16 China 2030’ book: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society, organized by the 
World Bank and the State Council of Development Research Center of the People’s Republic 
of China.
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development without ICT policies and state emulation.
In this scenario of intensifying interstate and corporate competition, 
China has been targeting what is conventionally called industry 4.0 - a con-
cept created in 2011 at the Hannover fair in Germany to refer to advanced 
manufacturing17. These are technological innovations such as artificial intel-
ligence, robotics, IoT, Big Data, autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, nanotech-
nology, biotechnology, energy storage, new materials (graphene) and quan-
tum computing.
The Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) policy, inspired by Germany’s 
“Industry 4.0” plan (discussed in 2011 and adopted in 2013), was approved 
by the State Council of China in 2015, focused on the development of smart 
manufacturing. This is a deepening of another 2010 study, entitled China’s 
Drive for Indigenous Innovation, which aimed to use the powerful chinese 
regulatory regime to force the reliance on foreign technology to be promoted 
by promoting national innovations. The MIC 2025 aims to boost China’s lead-
ership in global production and innovation networks, giving efficiency and 
quality to domestic products. The plan was prepared by the Ministry of Indus-
try and Information Technology (MIIT) with the inputs from 150 experts from 
the China Academy of Engineering.
This government document highlights 10 priority business sectors: 1) 
new advanced information technology; 2) automated machine-tools and ro-
botics; 3) aerospace and aeronautical equipment; 4) maritime equipment and 
high technology transportation; 5) modern railway equipment; 6) new energy 
vehicles and equipment; 7) power equipment; 8) agricultural equipment; 9) 
new materials; and 10) biopharmaceuticals and advanced medical products. 
To this end, the Chinese government is not only focused on innovation, but 
on the entire modern production and service chain. The central objective is 
to increase the national content of national components and materials first 
to 40% by 2020 and then to 70% by 2025. To this end, the Chinese govern-
ment’s strategy includes policies aimed at accelerating technology transfer ef-
forts and licensing requirements, acquisition of strategic foreign companies, 
as well as various of reverse engineering activities18. It is interesting to observe 
17 In Germany the Recommendations for implementing the strategic initiative Industrie 4.0 
was produced in 2013; and in the US, Report to the President Accelerating U.S. Advanced 
Manufacturing in 2014.
18 The Trump Government had placed Chinese Fujian Jinhua on a list of entities that cannot 
buy products from US companies, a move similar to that taken against China’s ZTE. Note that 
Fujian Jinhua is at the heart of MIC 2025, as it is one of China’s largest chip makers. View 





the goals in the automotive industry, a sector that link together information 
technologies, autonomous vehicles, new forms of energy and others.
Inphographic 1. Source: MIIT ( http://english.gov.cn/policies/infograph-
ics/2015/06/02/content_281475119391820.htm)
Made in China 2025 is definitely an ambitious plan to affirm China’s 
industrial and technological leadership along with a robust import substitu-
tion process. According to Xinhua agency, MIIT and the China Development 
Bank foresee funding programs - including loans, bonds and leasing - for ma-
jor projects, with funding estimated at over $ 45 billion for the 2016-202019 
period. It is a productive escalation that tends to intensify interstate and in-
ter-company competition, typical of the contexts of reorganization of world 
power. And that is why neither the ‘trade war’ unleashed by the United States 
19 See news from Xinhua official agency, available at:  http://english.gov.cn/state_council/
ministries/2017/10/12/content_281475904600274.htm. 
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against China in 2018, nor the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, chief financial of-
ficer of Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, boils down to displaced 
disputes within this broader geopolitical framework.
Final Remarks
There is no doubt that a country’s national development and global 
projection intertwine and strengthen each other - and China’s trajectory is 
emblematic of this synergy. The MIC 2025 is the cause and consequence of 
this process, the origins of which date back to the national reconstruction 
began in 1949 and revitalized after the reforms undertaken in the 1970s. If 
it is a fact that the 3rd Industrial Revolution and the so-called Industry 4.0 
will bring structural changes to production and production work, they do not 
dissociate themselves from the development and power of nations and, in 
effect, from their public policies toward the production of wealth (complex 
and tangible).
Getting back to the starting point. If, in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the eastern country was the object of capitalist expansion and succumbed to 
British hegemony, from the 1980s onwards, systemic changes and nation-
al policies have driven China’s rise. Deng’s reforms depended as much on 
rapprochement with the United States as on the opportunities arising from 
the new international division of labor, and on its flows of production, invest-
ment, and trade. None of this would be virtuous without the Chinese elite 
being able to perceive these changes and formulate public policies capable of 
meeting their challenges, overcoming several vulnerabilities and contradic-
tions, both internal and external. As the world economy succumbed to the lib-
eralizing narrative, China pursued development with consistent ICT policies 
and publicly emulated development banks. The growing economic complex-
ity has been revealing of national performance, reflected in factors as diverse 
as HDI or patent registration.
Naturally, China’s greater geo-economic power requires greater geo-
political assertiveness. The Chinese rise tenses the hegemonic power struc-
tures led by the United States in several dimensions. It is undoubtedly from 
this result that new configurations of power will emerge, with greater or less-
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The purpose of this article is to analyze the relationship between development and 
global power of China. And, more specifically, how the Made in China 2025 policy is 
designed to deepen China’s development by driving strategic sectors of smart man-
ufacturing and other innovations. To do so, it needs to understand how China has 
taken advantage of systemic changes since the 1970s to unleash a cycle of compre-
hensive reforms mobilizing industrial, commercial and technological (ICT) policies. 
That is, without state emulation there is no economic complexity or expansion of the 
country’s presence in the world. The proposed argument is that the interweaving 
between the internal and international dimensions compose the key of the rise of the 
powers - imperative underestimated by the narratives of liberal globalization - whose 
epicenter remains the national development. 
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